In this paper we discuss two hybrid languages , L(∀) and L(↓), and provide them with complete axiomatizations. Both languages combine features of modal and classical logic. Like modal languages, they contain modal operators and have a Kripke semantics. Unlike modal languages, in these systems it is possible to 'label' states by using ∀ and ↓ to bind special state variables .
Introduction
Propositional modal languages are simple and attractive formalisms that have been widely applied in computer science and other disciplines. However their very simplicity soon leads to expressivity problems. It is unusual for the basic modal language to be used. Rather, its expressivity is boosted by the addition of various (application dependent) new modalities, such as the universal modality, the Until operator, transitive closure operators, counting modalities, and so on. While many of the resulting systems of extended modal logic have proved interesting and important (Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) is a particularly noteworthy example) some seem rather ad-hoc and have proved difficult to axiomatize. This paper explores the consequences of following a different route to enhanced modal expressivity: hybridization. Hybridization is an attempt to combine the key ideas of modal syntax and semantics with direct quantification over states. That is, hybrid languages retain the modal operators and Kripke semantics typical of modal logic. In addition, however, they contain variables over states and various (essentially classical) mechanisms for binding them. Hybridization has not been widely investigated. In fact, as far as we are aware, Bull [5] , Passy and Tinchev [12] , Goranko [8, 9, 10] , Blackburn and Seligman [2, 3] and Seligman [15, 16] is a fairly exhaustive list of technical papers on the subject. Most of this work has dealt with very strong hybrid languages, namely hybrid languages enriched with the universal modality (dis-The usual semantics of propositional modal logic is Kripke semantics. Kripke semantics is a three-place relation |= that can hold between a model, a state in that model, and a formula. A model M is a triple (S, R, V ) such that S is a non-empty set of states, R is a binary relation on S (the transition relation), and V : PROP −→ Pow (S), is the valuation, which tells us at which states (if any) each propositional symbol is true. The pair (S, R) is called the frame underlying the model.
The |= relation is defined as follows. Let M = (S, R, V ) and s ∈ S. Then:
iff ∀s (sRs ⇒ M, s |= ϕ).
If M, s |= ϕ we say that ϕ is satisfied in M at s. The key intuition to note about Kripke semantics is its locality: formulae are evaluated in models at some particular state (called the current state), and the function of the 2 operator is to scan the states accessible from the current state via the transition relation R. Note that
M, s |= 3ϕ iff ∃s (sRs & M, s |= ϕ).
We shall now hybridize propositional modal logic. The basic idea is to allow ourselves to quantify across states (in various ways) while staying as close to the syntax and semantics of the modal language as possible.
Hybrid syntax
We hybridize modal syntax by making two changes. The first is to sort the atomic symbols of the modal language: instead of having just one kind of atomic symbol (namely the symbols in PROP) we shall add two other kinds of atomic symbol: state variables and nominals. The second change is to add binders. Binders will be used to bind state variables (but not nominals or propositional symbols). In this paper, two different binders will be considered, namely ∀ and ↓.
Let's make these ideas precise. Assume we have a denumerably infinite set SVAR = {x, y, z, . . .}, and a finite or denumerably infinite set NOM (if this set is not empty we typically write its elements as i, j, k, . . ., and so on). Assume that SVAR, NOM and PROP are pairwise disjoint. We call SVAR the set of state variables, NOM the set of nominals, SVAR ∪ NOM the set of state symbols, and SVAR ∪ NOM ∪ PROP the set of atoms. Both state variables and nominals (that is, both types of state symbol) will be used to 'label' states. The difference is simply that whereas state variables can be bound by binders, nominals cannot. In effect, nominals are like the 'parameters' used in proof theory: when we use them to make substitutions, we don't have to worry about accidental binding.
Let B ∈ {∀, ↓}. We build the well-formed formulae of L(B), the hybrid language in B (over SVAR, NOM and PROP) as follows:
(Here a ∈ ATOM and x ∈ SVAR.) We define 3 and other Booleans in the usual way. When working in a language L(∀) (over some choice of SVAR, NOM and PROP) we define ∃xϕ := ¬∀x¬ϕ. In L(↓) no such definition is needed, for this binder will be self-dual. In what follows, we generally assume that some choice of SVAR, NOM and PROP has been fixed, and when we speak of hybrid languages, we mean the two languages L(∀) and L(↓) defined over these sets. Sometimes, however, we will need to be more explicit about which nominals we have at our disposal. In particular, when we prove the completeness results we will need to expand our languages with a denumerably infinite set of new nominals (they will play a role analogous to the Henkin constants used in first-order completeness proofs).
Note that the syntactic definition of the language L(B) treats all atoms -whether state variables, nominals, or ordinary propositional symbols -as formulae. That is, although state symbols will allow us to 'label' or 'name' states, we can combine them with arbitrary formulae using the Boolean and modal operators, and when we do this we construct new formulae. For example, the following is a well-formed formula of L(∀) : 3
(x ∧ p ∧ 3(i ∧ q)) ∧ ∀x(x → ¬3x).
In view of this, it should be clear that although we have introduced some sort of quantification over states, we have distorted the syntax of propositional modal logic as little as possible: the entities we bind are formulae, that is, the type of entity used in propositional modal languages. As a result of this, hybrid languages work in a rather novel way. Although the semantics will ensure that state variables and nominals perform the kind of labeling tasks carried out by terms in first-order languages, they are not segregated from the rest of the language (as terms are in first-order languages) but can be freely mixed with propositional information. We need to draw a distinction between free and bound state variables and to perform substitutions. The intuition behind these is essentially classical. For example, in the above formula, the first occurrence of x is free and the last three are bound. We first define what it means for an occurrence of a state variable x to be free in a formula ϕ:
2. An occurrence of x is free in ¬ϕ or 2ϕ iff it is free in ϕ, and an occurrence of x is free in ϕ ∧ ψ iff it is free in ϕ or in ψ. 3. An occurrence of x is free in Byϕ iff it is free in ϕ and x = y. (Here B ∈ {∀, ↓}.)
An occurrence of a state variable that is not free is called bound. The set of free state variables in a formula ϕ is the set of state variables that have at least one free occurrence in ϕ. A formula that contains no free state variables is called a sentence.
Let ϕ be a formula, s be a state symbol, and x a state variable. Then ϕ[s/x], the formula obtained by substituting s for all free occurrences of x in ϕ, is defined as follows: As in classical logic, when we make substitutions for logical purposes we have to guard against accidental binding. That is, we need a definition of when a state symbol is substitutable for a state variable. Nominals, of course, are always substitutable, for as they cannot be bound, they cannot be accidentally bound. What about state variables? Let x and z be state variables and define:
1. If ϕ ∈ ATOM, then z is substitutable for x in ϕ. 2. z is substitutable for x in ¬ϕ or 2ϕ iff z is substitutable for x in ϕ, and z is substitutable for x in ϕ ∧ ψ iff z is substitutable for x in both ϕ and ψ. 3. z is substitutable for x in Byϕ iff x does not occur free in ϕ, or y = z and z is substitutable for x in ϕ.
Hybrid semantics
The basic idea underlying the semantics is straightforward. We want nominals to be formulae that 'name' states, and state variables to be formulae that act as 'variables ranging across states'. To achieve this we need merely stipulate that both state variables and nominals are interpreted by singleton subsets of models. That is, any state variable, and any nominal, will be satisfied at exactly one state in any model. Such formulae 'label' the unique state that satisfies them. One other thing needs doing. As we wish to bind state variables (but not nominals or propositional symbols) we should be careful how we handle their interpretation. But there is a standard way of dealing with such issues: make use of the Tarskian idea of assignment functions. That is, while we will use valuations to handle the semantics of propositional symbols and nominals, we will handle the semantics of state variables separately, via assignment functions. This motivates the following definition. Now for the satisfaction definition. Obviously we should relativize the Kripke satisfaction definition to standard assignments (that is, we must turn |= into a four-place relation). So, let M = (S, R, V ) be a standard model, and g a standard assignment. For any atom a, let [V, g](a) = g(a) if a is a state variable, and V (a) otherwise. Then, for the binder-free fragment of our languages we have the following clauses:
Definition 2.1 Let L(B) be a hybrid language over PROP, NOM and SVAR (where B ∈ {∀, ↓}). A model M for L(B) is a triple (S, R, V ) such that S is a non-empty set, R a binary relation on S, and V
Now for the binders. Here is the clause for ∀:
1 Incidentally, modal languages enriched with state symbols but without binders have been investigated; see Gargov and Goranko [7] and Blackburn [1] .
The notation g x ∼ g (we say "g is an x-variant of g") means that g is a standard assignment (on M) that agrees with g on all arguments save possibly x. That is, ∀ is essentially the classical universal quantifier in a modal setting. Note that it follows that the dual binder ∃ receives the expected interpretation, namely:
Next, the clause for ↓:
That is, ↓ binds state variables to the current state; it creates a label for the here-andnow. Given the importance of the current state to Kripke semantics, this is a natural choice of binder. Note that ↓ is self-dual. That is, M, g, s |= ↓xϕ iff M, g, s |= ¬↓x¬ϕ.
Let ϕ be any formula of L(B). If M, g, s |= ϕ then we say ϕ is satisfied in M at s under g. Note that, as in classical logic, whether or not a sentence is satisfied is independent of the choice of assignment. That is, if ϕ is a sentence, then there is an assignment g such that M, g, s |= ϕ iff for every assignment g, M, g, s |= ϕ. A formula is valid on a frame (S, R) iff for all standard models M = (S, R, V ) (that is, all standard models that have (S, R) as their underlying frame), all standard assignments g on M, and all states s ∈ S, M, g, s |= ϕ. A formula is valid iff it is valid on all frames.
To close this section, some historical remarks. The earliest discussions of ∀ (indeed, the earliest discussion of hybrid languages we know of) seem to be those of Prior [13] Chapter V.6 and and Bull [5] . These papers deal with tense logic enriched with the hybrid binder ∀ and the universal modality A. 2 However, this work seems to have lain dormant for about 15 years until Passy and Tinchev [11] introduced ∀ and A into propositional dynamic logic. (They remark that the idea of ∀ was suggested to them by Skordev, who in turn was inspired by certain investigations in recursion theory.) Passy and Tinchev [12] is an excellent overview of this line of work and its connections with extended modal logic. However, in spite of Passy and Tinchev's skillful defense of the importance of 'labels' to modal logic, the idea does not seem to have caught on. More recently, Seligman [15, 16] has proved a cut-elimination result for a system expressively equivalent to L(∀) enriched by the universal modality.
The ↓ binder seems to have been independently invented on even more occasions than ∀. For example, Richards et. al. [14] introduce ↓ as part of an investigation into temporal semantics and temporal databases, Sellink [17] uses it to aid reasoning about automata, and Cresswell [6] uses it as part of his investigation of indexicality in natural language. Nonetheless, none of these systems is, strictly speaking, a hybrid language: they don't treat state variables as formulae. The earliest use of ↓ in a genuine hybrid language seems to be Goranko [8] . Other papers investigating ↓ in hybrid settings include Blackburn and Seligman [2, 3] (the first of these papers contains an example showing the failure of the finite model property for ↓, and proves undecidability) and Goranko [9, 10] .
Remarks on expressivity
Before turning to completeness, it will be helpful to explore the expressivity of L(∀) and L(↓); for a more detailed discussion, see Blackburn and Seligman [2, 3] .
First, both L(∀) and L(↓) are more expressive than propositional modal logic. For example, it is well-known that no formula of propositional modal logic is valid on precisely those frames with an irreflexive transition relation. However there is a sentence of L(↓) with this property, namely:
↓x¬3x.
Similarly, it is well-known that the Until operator is not definable in propositional modal logic. However, it is definable in L(∀):
Second, note that L(∀) is strictly more expressive than L(↓). To see this, note that we can define ↓ in L(∀) by
To see this, note that sentences of L(↓) are preserved under the formation of generated submodels. 3 
s is the submodel of M generated by s. This can be proved by induction on the structure of ϕ. The key point to note is that occurrences of ↓ in ϕ must bind state variables to local states (that is, to states in M s ). In short, like propositional modal logic, L(↓) is a truly local language.
On the other hand, state variable binding in L(∀) is not local in this sense: a formula of the form ∃xϕ may well be true precisely because it is possible to bind x to a state outside the submodel generated by the current state. And indeed, it is easy to find sentences of L(∀) that are not preserved under the formation of generated submodels. 4 It follows that no sentence of L(↓) can define ∀.
Third, like propositional modal logic, both L(∀) and L(↓) can be regarded as fragments of classical logic. To see this, note that we can extend the standard translation of propositional modal logic into the corresponding first-order language to both hybrid languages. Recall that the first-order language corresponding to a propositional modal language contains a binary relation symbol R, a denumerably infinite collection of one-place symbols P , Q, R, and so on (these correspond to the elements p, q, r of PROP) and a denumerably infinite collection of first-order variables. Any model M = (S, R, V ) can be regarded as first-order model for the correspondence language: the relation R interprets the symbol R, and for all p ∈ PROP, the subset V (p) interprets the unary predicate symbol P . The standard translation for propositional 3 Given a model M = (S, R, V ) and a state s of S, the submodel of M generated by s is the smallest submodel of M that contains s and is R-closed. That is, the submodel generated by s contains exactly those states of M that are accessible from s by a finite number of transitions along R. modal logic into this language is defined as follows:
, where y is a fresh variable.
Note that for any modal formula ϕ, ST x (ϕ) is a formula of the correspondence language containing exactly one free variable, namely
means that the model M satisfies the first-order formula ST x (ϕ) when s is assigned as the denotation of its single free variable x.) To extend this translation to cover hybrid languages, we need merely add the nominals in NOM as constants to the correspondence language and define:
(Note that the first clause implicitly assumes we are using the same set of symbols for state variables and first-order variables. This is to avoid needless notational clutter.) Using this extended translation we can translate every sentence from our hybrid languages to an equivalent one-free-variable formula of the (NOM enriched) correspondence language. (Incidentally, if we wanted to, we could translate nominals as free variables rather than enriching the correspondence language with constants.) So neither L(∀) nor L(↓) is stronger than the correspondence language.
In fact, both hybrid languages are strictly weaker than the correspondence language. In particular, L(∀) is not strong enough to capture the one-free-variable fragment of the correspondence language, as is shown in Blackburn and Seligman [2] . Nonetheless it is easy to gain full first-order expressivity: simply add the universal modality.
As we mentioned earlier, the universal modality A has the following satisfaction definition: M, s |= Aϕ iff for all states s in M, M, s |= ϕ. That is, Aϕ means 'ϕ holds at all states'. Define Eϕ := ¬A¬ϕ, and note that Eϕ means that 'ϕ holds at some state'. Now, the key point to observe is that the universal modality gives us the power to inspect non-local states. In particular, note that E(x∧ϕ) is essentially a 'test' which examines the state labeled by x and checks whether ϕ holds there. With this observed, it is easy to define a hybrid translation from the correspondence language into L(∀)+A. 5 Let L x 0 be the set of formulae of the correspondence language in which x is the only free variable, and x does not occur bound. Then (again assuming that the state variables in L(∀) + A are identical with the first-order variables in L x 0 ) we 5 The following translation dates back (at least) to Prior [13] (see in particular Chapter 5 and Appendix B). It extends to first-order languages of arbitrary signature; see Blackburn and Seligman [2] for further discussion.
translate L x 0 into L(∀) + A as follows:
Note that in the cases when either y or z is the special variable x, the hybrid translation produces formulae which are logically equivalent to much simpler formulae. For example, HT (P x) is ↓xE(x ∧ p), which is equivalent to p. Indeed, adding the universal modality even to L(↓) yields a language expressively equivalent to the correspondence language. To see this, it suffices to note that in such a language we can define ∀xϕ := ↓yA↓xA(y → ϕ), where y is a variable not occurring in ϕ To sum up: both L(∀) and L(↓) are genuine expressive extensions of propositional modal logic. L(↓) is the weaker of the two, and retains more of the locality properties of the underlying modal language. On the other hand, while L(∀) has obvious nonlocal properties, it is not a notational variant of the correspondence language; it is strictly weaker. Finally, boosting either L(∀) or L(↓) to full first-order strength is straightforward: just add A.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the only completeness results for hybrid languages we know of (in particular, Bull [5] , Passy and Tinchev [12] , Goranko [9, 10] ) are for hybrid languages containing the universal modality. But what are we to do when we don't have access to A? This question dominates the rest of the paper.
The hybrid logic of ∀
Given any countable language L(∀), we now axiomatize the set of valid L(∀)-formulae. The logic will be an extension of the usual axiomatization of the minimal modal logic K. In what follows, v is used as a metavariable over state variables, s as a metavariable over state symbols, and 3 k and 2 k denote k-length sequences of 3s and 2s respectively.
H(∀), the hybrid logic of ∀, is defined to be the smallest set of L(∀)-formulae that is closed under the following conditions. First, it must contain the minimal modal logic K. That is, it contains all instances of propositional tautologies, all instances of the distribution schema
and is closed under modus ponens (if {ϕ, ϕ → ψ} ⊆ H(∀) then ψ ∈ H(∀)) and necessitation (if ϕ ∈ H(∀) then 2ϕ ∈ H(∀)). In addition, it contains all instances of the five axiom schemas listed below and is closed under generalization (if ϕ ∈ H(∀) then ∀vϕ ∈ H(∀)).
Here are the required axiom schemas: 
Q1 and Q2 should be familiar. They are standard axiom schemas governing the universal quantifier ∀ found in first-order languages, and apply just as well to the hybrid universal quantifier. Name and Nom are probably unfamiliar. Name reflects the fact that it is always possible to bind state variable to the current state, while Nom reflects the fact that state variables are true at exactly one state. Together, Name and Nom are our modal theory of labeling. (Another way of thinking about them is to note that the theory of labeling they embody is analogous to something familiar from classical logic: the theory of equality.) Last, but certainly not least, we have analogs of the Barcan axioms, familiar from first-order modal logic. One important comment must be made here. In first-order modal logic, the status of Barcan is open to debate. This is because the quantifiers in first-order modal logic range over the points in some underlying collection of first-order models, and whether or not Barcan is valid depends on what assumptions we make about this collection. In hybrid languages, however, ∀ ranges over the states themselves. As a result, Barcan's logical status is fixed: it is a fundamental validity.
If a formula ϕ belongs to H(∀) then we say that ϕ is a theorem of H(∀) and write ϕ. A formula ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ is not a theorem. By an H(∀)-proof in a language L(∀) we mean a finite sequence of L(∀)-formula, each item of which is an axiom, or is obtained from earlier items in the sequence using the rules of proof. If Γ is a set of formulae, and ϕ a formula, then we say that ϕ is a consequence of Γ iff there is a formula χ such that χ is a conjunction of (finitely many) formulae in Γ and χ → ϕ; in such a case we write Γ ϕ. A set of sentences Γ is consistent iff it is not the case
it is consistent and any set of L(∀)-formulae that properly extends it is inconsistent.
Our first goal is to show that H(∀) is sound: that is, if ϕ is a theorem then ϕ is valid. We need two preliminary lemmas concerning variables and substitution. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. 
Lemma 3.2 (Substitution Lemma) Let
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ.
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness) The logic H(∀) is sound with respect to the class of all standard models.
Proof. All instances of the minimal modal logic K in H(∀) are valid, and modus ponens, necessitation and generalization preserve validity, so it only remains to check that all instances of the additional schemas are valid too. We give the required arguments for Q2, Name, and Barcan and leave Q1 and Nom to the reader.
(Q2 
is the instance of Q2 where s is the nominal i, the result follows using clause 2 of the Substitution Lemma.
(Name). M, g, s |= ∃xx iff for some assignment g such that g
Clearly a suitable g exists: we need merely stipulate that g is to be the x-variant of g such that g (x) = {s}.
(Barcan). Consider ∀x2ϕ → 2∀xϕ. Then M, g, s |= ∀x2ϕ iff for all g such that g
x ∼ g and all t such that sRt, M, g , t |= ϕ. This is equivalent to: for all t such that sRt and all g such that g
Familiarity with modal and classical logic is a reliable guide to the behavior of H(∀). For example, α-conversion holds:
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that y is substitutable for x in ϕ, and that ϕ has no free occurrences of y. Then ∀xϕ ↔ ∀yϕ[y/x].
Proof. ∀xϕ → ϕ[y/x] is an instance of the Q2 schema. Prefix ∀y before it using generalization, and then distribute ∀y over the implication using the Q1 axiom; this proves the left to right implication. Next, note that under our assumptions concerning y, we have that x is substitutable for y in ϕ[y/x], and x has no free occurrences in ϕ[y/x]. The right to left direction thus reduces to the previous case.
Moreover, just as we can 'generalize on constants' in first-order logic, we can 'generalize on nominals' in H(∀). More precisely: Nor will the reader find it difficult to prove the following familiar looking schemas: Lemma 3. 6 In H(∀) we have that:
Proof. As in first-order logic.
And in fact, H(∀) is complete: every consistent set of formulae has a model. We shall show this using a fairly even-handed mixture of modal and first-order techniques. In particular, from modal logic we shall borrow the idea of canonical models, and from classical logic the idea of witnessed sets. As we shall see, thanks to our theory of labeling and the presence of the Barcan analogs, these ideas work together smoothly. Note that any witnessed MCS Γ contains at least one nominal, as all instances of the Name axiom belong to Γ.
Definition 3.7 (Canonical Models) For any countable language
Witnessed sets are important because they provide the structure needed to handle the hybrid quantifiers in the manner familiar from Henkin-style completeness proofs for classical logic. That is, witnessed MCSs will be used for the inductive clause for the quantifiers in the Truth Lemma ("Truth = Membership in an MCS") we will eventually prove.
Roughly speaking, the model we shall eventually define will be made of witnessed MCSs related by the usual modal canonical relation, so the first thing we need to check is that any consistent set of sentences can be expanded to a witnessed MCS. In fact, this can be done, provided we expand the languages with countably many new nominals. 
Lemma 3.9 (Extended Lindenbaum Lemma) Let L(∀) and L(∀)
+ be two count- able languages such that L(∀) + is L(∀) extended
.} be an enumeration of all L(∀)
+ -formulae. We define the witnessed MCS Γ + we require inductively. Let Γ 0 = Γ. Note that Γ 0 contains no nominals from E n (as it is a set of L(∀)-formulae) and that it is consistent when regarded as a set of L(∀) + -formulae. (To see this, note that if we could prove ⊥ by making use of nominals from E n , then by replacing all the (finitely many) E n nominals in such a proof with state variables from L(∀), we could construct a proof of ⊥ in L(∀), which is impossible.) We define Γ n as follows. If Γ n ∪ {ϕ n } is inconsistent, then Γ n+1 = Γ n . Otherwise:
(Here i is the first nominal in the enumeration E n which is not used in the definitions of Γ i for all i ≤ n and also does not appear in ϕ n .) Let Γ + = n≥0 Γ n . By construction it is maximal and witnessed; it remains to show it is consistent. Now, if Γ + is inconsistent, then for some n ∈ ω, Γ n is inconsistent, for all the (finitely many) formulae required to prove inconsistency belong to some Γ n . But, as we shall now show by induction, all Γ n are consistent, hence Γ + is too. Clearly all we need to check is that expansions using clause 2 preserve consistency. To show this, argue by contrapositive. Suppose We now set about defining the standard models (and standard assignments) needed to prove completeness. As a first step, we define the concept of witnessed models. Given a witnessed MCS Σ, we form the witnessed model generated by Σ by taking the submodel of the canonical model generated by Σ, and then throwing away any non-witnessed MCSs it contains. More precisely: Proof. Suppose Γ and ∆ are different. Then there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Γ and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆. The MCSs Γ and ∆ are reachable from Σ in finitely many R w -steps and hence there are m, n ∈ ω such that 3 m (s ∧ ϕ) ∈ Σ and 3 n (s ∧¬ϕ) ∈ Σ. As Σ contains every instance of the Nom schema, for some state variable x that does not occur freely in ϕ, ∀x [3 m 
∈ Σ, and therefore 2 n (s → ϕ) ∈ Σ. But because both 3 n (s ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ Σ and 2 n (s → ϕ) ∈ Σ it follows by easy modal reasoning that 3 n (s ∧ ¬ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Σ, which contradicts the consistency of Σ. We conclude that Γ and ∆ are identical. (Note that nothing in this proof trades on the fact that we are working with witnessed MCSs. In fact, the lemma holds for any submodel of a generated submodel of the canonical model.)
Recall that a standard model is a model in which every nominal is true at exactly one state. From the previous lemma we know that nominals are contained in at most one MCS in a witnessed model, so it is clear that the natural definition of valuation on witnessed models (that is, that symbols are true at precisely the MCSs which contain them) almost provides us with a standard model. Moreover, it also follows from the previous lemma that the natural way of defining an assignment on witnessed models (namely, stipulating that g(x) is to be the set of MCSs containing x) almost gives us the standard assignment we require. 
this set is non-empty, and V (i) = { * } otherwise. If M = (S, R, V ) is a completed model of a witnessed model M w , then the completed assignment g on M is defined as follows: for all state variables x, g(x) = {Γ ∈ M
w | x ∈ Γ} if this set is non-empty, and g(x) = { * } otherwise.
Clearly (by Lemma 3.11) completed models are standard models and completed assignments are standard assignments, thus (by Theorem 3.3) all theorems of the logic H(∀) are true in completed models with respect to the relevant completed assignment. There is one other point about the previous definition that the reader should note: we only glue on a dummy state * when we are forced to. As a consequence, every state in a completed model is labeled by some state symbol. This will shortly help us to give a smooth proof of the Truth Lemma.
But before we can prove the Truth Lemma we need to establish a crucial fact: that completed models contain all the information required to cope with the modalities. That is, we need an Existence Lemma which tells us that if 3ϕ belongs to an MCS ∆ in a completed model then there is an R c -successor MCS Γ, which also belongs to the completed model , and contains ϕ. This is not obvious. We formed the completed model by throwing away non-witnessed MCSs. How do we know that we did not throw away the ϕ-containing successor MCS Γ that we need?
In fact, by making use of the Barcan analogs, we can prove the required Existence Lemma. First a technical preliminary:
Lemma 3.13 Let θ and χ be formulae and x and y state variables such that y is substitutable for x in χ, and y does not have free occurrences in either θ or χ. Then 3θ → ∃y3((∃xχ → χ[y/x]) ∧ θ).

Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.4 that ∃xχ → ∃yχ[y/x], hence by clause 1 of Lemma 3.6, ∃y(∃xχ → χ[y/x]), hence θ → (∃y(∃xχ → χ[y/x]) ∧ θ). Applying clause 2 of Lemma 3.6 yields θ → ∃y((∃xχ → χ[y/x]) ∧ θ). Easy modal reasoning yields 3θ → 3∃y((∃xχ → χ[y/x]) ∧ θ). Using the contrapositive of Barcan, we obtain 3θ → ∃y3((∃xχ → χ[y/x]) ∧ θ).
Lemma 3.14 (Existence Lemma for Witnessed Models) Let ∆ be a witnessed MCS in some countable language L(∀). If 3ϕ ∈ ∆ then there is a witnessed L(∀)-MCS Γ such that ∆R
c Γ and ϕ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Define Ψ = {ψ | 2ψ ∈ ∆} and Γ 0 = {ϕ} ∪ Ψ. The proof that Γ 0 is consistent is standard. If we can expand Γ 0 to a witnessed MCS Ω, then Ω will be a suitable choice of Γ. We show that it is possible to make this expansion.
Enumerate all the L(∀)-formulae that are of the form ∃vϕ, where v can be any state variable. We shall inductively expand Γ 0 by adding a suitable witness conditional for each formula in the enumeration. By w(∃vχ, i) , the witness conditional for ∃vχ in nominal i, we mean the formula ∃vχ → χ [i/v] . We shall show that if ξ n+1 is the n+1-th formula in the enumeration, then it is always possible to choose a nominal i n+1 such that the set Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪{w(ξ n+1 , i n+1 )} is consistent. Indeed, we will show that it is possible to choose i n+1 so that 3(ϕ∧w(ξ 1 
To construct the witness conditional for ξ n+1 , assume we have already constructed Γ n containing witness conditionals w( (Here ξ 1 ,. . . , ξ n are the first n items in the enumeration.) Let
Now, suppose that ξ n+1 is ∃vχ. By the previous lemma we have 3θ
where y is some state variable that does not appear in θ or χ. But 3θ ∈ ∆ and so ∃y3(
(that is, w(ξ n+1 , i n+1 )) as our witness conditional and define
But is Γ n+1 consistent? Suppose it is not. Then there is a conjunction τ of (finitely many) formulae in Ψ such that τ → ¬(ϕ ∧ w 1 ∧ · · ·∧ w n+1 ) (here we have abbreviated w(ξ i , i i ) to w i ). By easy modal reasoning we obtain 2τ → ¬3(ϕ ∧ w 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w n+1 ) ∈ ∆. But 2τ ∈ ∆ and so ¬3(ϕ ∧ w 1 ∧ · · · ∧ w n+1 ) ∈ ∆, which contradicts the consistency of ∆. n≥0 Γ n is consistent since for every n ∈ ω, Γ n is. Now use the usual version of the Lindenbaum Lemma to expand n≥0 Γ n to the required witnessed MCS Ω. For the other direction assume M, g, ∆ |= ∃xψ. This is, there exists an s ∈ M such that M, g , ∆ |= ψ, where g x ∼ g and g (x) = {s}. Now, because of the way we defined completed models, we know that either a nominal i or a state variable y is true at s with respect to g (note that this is so even if s = * ). Suppose now that a state variable y is satisfied at s. That is g(y) = {s}. Since y may not be substitutable for x in ψ, we have to replace all bound occurrences of y in ψ by some state variable that does not occur in ψ at all; call the formula we obtain ψ . It follows by Lemma 3.4 that ψ ↔ ψ is provable, hence by soundness it is valid, therefore M, g , ∆ |= ψ . Since y is now substitutable for x in ψ , by clause 1 of the Substitution Lemma M, g, ∆ |= ψ [y/x]. By the inductive hypothesis ψ [y/x] ∈ ∆, therefore, with the help of the contrapositive of the Q2 axiom, ∃xψ ∈ ∆. But it follows easily from clause 3 of Lemma 3.6 that ∃xψ ↔ ∃xψ is provable, and so ∃xψ ∈ ∆. 
Suppose first that a nominal i is satisfied at
The hybrid logic of ↓
We now present an axiomatization H(↓) of the set of valid L(↓)-formulae. Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this section, ϕ will mean that ϕ is a theorem of H(↓), and syntactic notions such as 'proof' and 'consistency' refer to H(↓)-proofs, H(↓)-consistency, and so on. In certain respects, H(↓) resembles H(∀). For a start, H(↓)
is also an extension of the minimal modal logic K, and the axioms governing ↓ are analogs of those governing ∀. Moreover, H(↓) is closed under the rules of modus ponens, necessitation, and an analog of generalization called localization, and contains a theory of labeling.
But there is an important difference. The Barcan analog for ↓ (that is, ↓x2ϕ → 2↓xϕ) is not valid. (Because ↓ binds to the current state, it cannot safely be permuted with 2, as the reader can check.) Now, Barcan was crucial to the model building strategy of the previous section: it allowed us to prove Lemma 3.13 and hence to construct witness conditionals in the proof of the Existence Lemma. What are we to do without it?
We shall use a technique from extended modal logic: additional rules of proof. Although ↓ works too locally to validate the Barcan analogs, because there are 'labels' in the language we can make use of the COV * rules. The COV * rules were introduced by the Sofia school of modal logic as part of their investigation of various forms of modal and propositional dynamic logic with names (see, for example, Passy and Tinchev [11] and Gargov and Goranko [7] ). Informally, COV * will be useful because it gives us a way of pasting in all the required witness formulae 'by hand', thus enabling us to adapt our proof strategy to ↓.
H(↓)
is the smallest set of L(↓)-formulae containing the minimal modal logic K, and all instances of the five axiom schemas listed below, that is closed under modus ponens, necessitation, localization (if ϕ ∈ H(↓) then ↓vϕ ∈ H(↓)) and COV * (explained below). Note that localization is just the ↓ analog of the rule of generalization given for ∀ in the previous section. Now for the five additional axiom schemas. As before, we use v and s as metavariables over state variables and state symbols respectively.
is an exact analog of its H(∀) counterpart. Q2 is too, save that its consequent is an implication, whose antecedent s reflects the fact that ↓ binds state variables to the current state. This motivates the inclusion of Q3 , which allows us to eliminate such 'antecedent labels'. Self-dual is self-explanatory. Nom is an analog of its H(∀) counterpart. Moreover, although ↓vv (the analog of the Name schema for H(∀)) has not been included as an axiom schema, it is easily derivable with the aid of Q3 , as we shall see. Thus H(↓) contains a theory of labeling.
Conspicuous by its absence is any analog of Barcan. So let us now define the COV * rules we shall use to replace it. As a first step we define:
Definition 4.1 (2-forms) Let L(↓) be a countable language, and # some symbol not belonging to L(↓). We define the set of 2-forms (for L(↓)) as follows: (1) # is a 2-form, (2) if L is a 2-form and ϕ is an L(↓)-formula then ϕ → L and 2L are 2-forms, and (3) nothing else is a 2-form.
Note that every 2-form L has exactly one occurrence of the symbol #. We use L(ψ) to denote the formula obtained from L by replacing the unique occurrence of # by a formula ψ. We can now define the COV * rules. For every 2-form L, and every nominal i not occurring in L, we have the following rule:
L(¬i) ∈ H(↓) implies L(⊥) ∈ H(↓).
As we shall now see, these rules preserve validity. First, two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 4.2 Let M = (S, R, V ) and M = (S, R, V ) be two standard models. For all standard assignments g on S, all states s in S and all formulae
We write V i ∼ V to indicate that V and V are standard valuations on the same frame that agree on all arguments save possibly i. 
Hence there is a state t with sRt and M, g, t |= ¬L 1 (⊥). By the inductive hypothesis there is valuation
An immediate corollary is that if the premise of a COV * rule is valid on a frame (S, R), then its conclusion is valid on (S, R) too. To see this, consider the contrapositive. Suppose we can falsify L(⊥) on (S, R). That is, suppose there is a standard valuation V , a standard assignment g, and a state s such that (S, R, V ), g, s |= L(⊥). Since i does not occur in L, by the previous lemma, there is a valuation V such that (S, R, V ), g, s |= L(¬i), and we have falsified the consequent on the same frame. Hence the COV * rules are validity-preserving. With this established, we are almost ready to prove the soundness of H(↓). We first state analogs of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. We now prove the completeness result. Once again, we shall do so by combining ideas from modal and classical logic, but this time there will be a bias towards modal ideas. The basic modal tool required is unchanged: as before we use canonical models. As we have mentioned, the chief difficulty facing us is that, without Barcan at our disposal, it is not clear how to prove the required Existence Lemma. The COV * rule gives us way around this difficulty. It does so by enabling us to build a special kind of named set:
Every closed MCS Γ is named. (To see this, suppose that for all nominals i, ¬i ∈ Γ. But since Γ is closed this means that ⊥∈ Γ, which contradicts the consistency of Γ.) Moreover, as we shall now show, by extending our language with new nominals and making use of the COV * rule, we can build all the closed sets we need: 
} where ϕ n = ¬L(⊥) and i is the first nominal in the enumeration E n which does not appear in
Clearly such a nominal exists, since only finitely many nominals from E n are contained in Γ k (for 0 ≤ k ≤ n) and L.
Let Γ + = n≥0 Γ n . As proofs contain only finitely many formulae, to show that Γ + is consistent it suffices to show that Γ n is consistent for all n > 0. Clearly this reduces to showing that if Γ n ∪ {ϕ n } is consistent, where ϕ n = ¬L(⊥), then Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {ϕ n } ∪ {¬L(¬i)} is consistent. So suppose for the sake of a contradiction that Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {ϕ n } ∪ {¬L(¬i)} is inconsistent. Then there is a formula χ which is a conjunction of finitely many formulae from Proof. Suppose Γ and ∆ are different MCSs in M n = (S n , R n , V n ), both of which contain s. Then there is a formula ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Γ and ¬ϕ ∈ ∆. Let Γ and ∆ be reachable from Σ in m ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0 R n -steps, respectively. We have 3 m (s ∧ ϕ) ∈ Σ. By the Nom schema, 2 k (s → ϕ) ∈ Σ, therefore s → ϕ ∈ ∆, hence ϕ ∈ ∆. So both ϕ and ¬ϕ are in ∆, which contradicts its consistency.
Lemma 4.18 (Existence Lemma for Named Models) Let
M n = (S n , R n , V n ) be a
named model yielded by some closed MCS Σ, and let Γ ∈ S
n be an MCS such that 3ϕ ∈ Γ. Then there is an MCS ∆ ∈ S n such that ΓR n ∆ and ϕ ∈ ∆.
Proof. If we can find a nominal i such that 3(i ∧ ϕ) is in Γ, then the set ∆ 0 = {i ∧ ϕ} ∪ {ψ | 2ψ ∈ Γ} is consistent. But then we can use the usual version of the Lindenbaum Lemma to extend ∆ 0 to an MCS ∆. Clearly ΓR∆, ∆ ∈ S n , and i names ∆, hence ∆ is the required MCS.
So it remains to show that there exists a nominal i such that 3(i ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ. For sake of a contradiction suppose that for each nominal i, ¬3(i ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ. By definition, all MCSs in the named model M n have names. So, let j be a name for Γ. Therefore we
As this holds for all nominals i, and since Σ is closed, we get 2
As Γ is reachable from Σ in m R n -steps, j → 2¬ϕ ∈ Γ and therefore 2¬ϕ ∈ Γ. As 3ϕ ∈ Γ, this contradicts the consistency of Γ. So for some nominal i,
Note that this proof is intrinsically modal (or path-based) whereas the proof of the Existence Lemma for H(∀) (that is, Lemma 3.14) was not. The proof just given makes explicit use of the MCS Σ that generates the named model; in fact, the proof hinges on the fact that there is a sequence of transitions leading from Σ to Γ so that Nom and COV * can be exploited. However no appeal is made to a generating MCS in the proof of Lemma 3.14; rather than a path-based argument, the proof of Lemma 3.14 exploits the strong, global, concept of witnessing available in H(∀). Now we are ready to define the model and assignment. Although we have no guarantee that named models are standard, or that natural definition of assignment gives rise to a standard assignment, Lemma 4.17 tells us that they have most of the properties we require. And in fact we can obtain suitable standard models and assignments simply by adding an extra dummy root node:
Definition 4.19 (Completed Models and Completed Assignments)
for all propositional symbols p, and for all nominals i, V (i) = {Γ ∈ S n | i ∈ Γ} if this set is non-empty, and V (i) = { * } otherwise.
The completed assignment g on M is defined as follows: for all state variables x, g(x) = {Γ ∈ S n | x ∈ Γ} if this set is non-empty, and g(x) = { * } otherwise.
It follows from Lemma 4.17 that completed models are standard. Moreover, completed assignments are standard too, thus (by the Soundness Theorem) all theorems of H(↓) are true in completed models with respect to completed assignments.
One other thing is worth noting: Definition 4.19 is slightly simpler than the analogous definition for H(∀). With H(∀) we had to take care to glue on the dummy state * only when it was required, for to prove the Truth Lemma we needed a guarantee that every state in the model had a label. With H(↓) we don't need to bother. As ↓ binds variables to the current state, the presence of * is irrelevant to the proof of the following Truth Lemma:
Proof + is a root of this model, or there is an additional point * which is. As every state in the model is named by one of the (countably many) state symbols in L(↓) + , the model is countable.
To close this section, let's deal with a matter that may be bothering some readers. Although we didn't use COV * in our discussion of H(∀), it should be clear that we could have done. (After all, the definition of a 2-form is essentially modal: it makes no mention of ↓.) So surely the COV * rules must be derivable in H(∀)? They are, and we can show this by making use of the fact that H(∀) contains Barcan analogs. 6 In what follows, means provable in H(∀).
Lemma 4.22 Given a language L(∀), let L be any 2-form in this language that contains no free occurrences of x. Then ∀xL(¬x) → L(⊥).
Proof. By induction on the structure of L. For the base case #, note that we have ∀x¬x →⊥, for this is equivalent to ∃xx, an instance of the Name schema. So let L 1 be a 2-form that contains no free occurrences of x and take ∀xL 1 (¬x) → L 1 (⊥) as the inductive hypothesis.
Suppose L is ϕ → L 1 , where ϕ contains no free occurrences of x. By the inductive hypothesis and propositional calculus we have (ϕ → ∀xL 1 (¬x)) → (ϕ → L 1 (⊥)). Now, ∀x(ϕ → L 1 (¬x)) → (ϕ → ∀xL 1 (¬x)) is an instance of Q1 . Hence ∀x(ϕ → L 1 (¬x)) → (ϕ → L 1 (⊥)). That is, ∀xL(¬x)) → L(⊥) as required.
Suppose L is 2L 1 . It follows from the inductive hypothesis, using simple modal reasoning, that 2∀xL 1 (¬x) → 2L 1 (⊥). As ∀x2L 1 (¬x) → 2∀xL 1 (¬x) (this is just an instance of Barcan) we have ∀x2L 1 (¬x) → 2L 1 (⊥). That is, ∀xL(¬x) → L(⊥) as required.
Proposition 4.23 The COV * rules are derivable in H(∀).
Proof. First we show that the simplest COV * rules (that is, the rules of the form if ¬i, for some nominal i, then ⊥) are derivable in H(∀). In fact they are vacuously derivable, for we cannot prove ¬i in H(∀) for any nominal i. This is immediate by the soundness of H(∀), for negations of nominals aren't valid. 
Concluding remarks
Hybridization is an interesting (and unusual) strategy for boosting modal expressivity. The basic mechanism -the use of state symbols to internalize labeling -is natural and can be developed in various directions. Nonetheless, hybrid completeness is a neglected topic. While there has been work on completeness for hybrid languages containing the universal modality, and for modal languages with nominals (essentially the free variable fragments of hybrid languages), this leaves a lot of unexplored territory in between.
6 Passy and Tinchev [12] make a similar observation for the version of COV * definable for hybridized PDL; their proof is more elegant than the one given below. This reflects the fact that the COV * rules for PDL with nominals are simpler than the version used in this paper; in particular, the internal structure available in PDL modalities means that 2-forms are not needed.
In this paper we presented completeness results for two hybrid languages, L(∀) and L(↓), neither of which contains the universal modality. Both results were proved by combining techniques from modal and classical logic, but the balance of modal and classical ideas was very different. Intuitively, L(∀) is more classical than L(↓). This is borne out by its completeness proof, which uses a fairly even-handed blend of modal and classical model-building techniques. The weaker language L(↓), on the other hand, is closer to the original modal language: in particular, it binds state variables locally. Because of its locality, we applied a technique from extended modal logic, the use of the COV * rules of proof, and worked with named models. The completeness proof for L(↓), and in particular, the proof of the Existence Lemma, had a strong modal bias.
Since completing this paper we have continued to investigate hybrid completeness. In one line of work (see Blackburn Given the fundamental importance of successor states to Kripke semantics, this is a natural choice of binder. Over transitive frames, the Barcan analogs for this binder are valid, and completeness can be proved without making use of COV * . However the completeness proof is not similar to the proof given here for H(∀); various nonclassical features of the ↓ 1 block straightforward adaptations of this approach. In fact, in spite of the fact that no use of COV * is made, the completeness proof is much closer to the proof given for H(↓). In particular, it hinges on the use of named models, and the Existence Lemma is proved using a path-based argument that makes explicit use of the generating MCS.
